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Since their enactment in the mid-1980s, mandatory minimum sentencing 
provisions have been a prominent feature of the Controlled Substances 
Act. Observers argue that these mandatory minimum provisions generate 
unjustifiably harsh sentences for many federal criminal defendants 
convicted of drug offenses and significantly contribute to racial inequality 
in the federal criminal system. This essay describes another important 
characteristic of these mandatory minimums—their reach beyond cases in 
which they are actually charged. I call this phenomenon and its attendant 
institutional framework mandatory minimum entrenchment. Rather than 
conceptualizing mandatory minimums as a binary component of a 
defendant’s case that either applies or does not, I argue it is more realistic 
to confront mandatory minimums as a primary element in a larger 
sentencing framework. 
This essay first describes the emergence of mandatory minimums, which 
Congress added to the Controlled Substances Act roughly fifteen years 
after its passage. Part II describes how mandatory minimums were hastily 
created in response to political and public pressure. Part III explains how 
mandatory minimums then became entrenched in federal sentencing of 
defendants convicted of drug offenses. Entrenchment flourished as the 
mandatory minimums for drug offenses influenced the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s drug guidelines, to which prosecutors and judges are 
formally and behaviorally tethered. Part III then presents a case study that 
illustrates mandatory minimum entrenchment: showing that sentences for 
low-level, nonviolent drug defendants remained relatively stable despite a 
sweeping 2013 policy change that meaningfully reduced mandatory 
minimum charging in this group. The essay ends in Part IV, which calls 
on Congress to amend the Controlled Substances Act to either eliminate 
or reduce its mandatory minimum provisions. 
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Ranging up to life imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentencing 
provisions of the Controlled Substances Act are perhaps the Act’s most controversial 
criminal provisions. These provisions require lengthy sentences for many defendants 
convicted of drug offenses and are a source of racial disparity within the federal 
criminal system. Although mandatory minimums appear in some other federal 
criminal statutes,1 most mandatory minimums apply to defendants convicted of drug 
offenses. For example, in fiscal year 2017, defendants convicted of drug offenses 
comprised roughly 65% of federal defendants who were charged with an offense 
carrying a mandatory minimum, and, conversely, 44% of federal criminal 
defendants charged with a drug offense faced a mandatory minimum.2  
Mandatory minimums have not always been prevalent in federal drug cases. 
This essay explores the rapid expansion of mandatory minimums in federal drug 
trafficking prosecutions and documents the extent to which they have become 
embedded in federal sentencing. Part II begins by describing how mandatory 
minimums grew pervasive for federal drug defendants in the late 1980s before a 
partial retreat in the decades that followed. Part II ends by describing criticisms and 
defenses of the Act’s mandatory minimum provisions and presents figures that 
depict trends in mandatory minimum charging and sentencing over time.  
Part III describes a phenomenon that I call mandatory minimum entrenchment 
and presents a case study that illustrates this phenomenon. Both formal and 
behavioral aspects of the federal criminal system’s prosecution of drug crime 
generate this entrenchment, which I argue has significant implications for the federal 
criminal system and its reformers. The first implication is that the harsh effects of 
mandatory minimums are broader and affect more defendants than previously 
thought. In other words, mandatory minimums can affect the sentences of 
defendants for whom a mandatory minimum is not charged or applied. A narrow 
focus on only those defendants charged with mandatory minimums will overlook 
many affected defendants. The second, corollary implication is that any reform 
effort that seeks to undo the harsh effects of mandatory minimums must be more 
holistic than simply decreasing mandatory minimum charging. 
A case study presented in Part III.B illustrates this entrenchment. In August 
2013, Attorney General Eric Holder issued a memorandum that instructed all federal 
 
1    Several other federal crimes include mandatory minimums, including firearm offenses 
(see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2015)), and sexual offenses involving minors (see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(b) (2012)). 
2    Author’s own calculations using the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s datafiles. See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, Commission Datafiles, 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/datafiles/commission-datafiles (last visited July 13, 2020) 
[hereinafter Commission Datafiles]. These annual data files contain detailed case information for 
nearly all defendants sentenced in federal courts in each fiscal year. The data include cases 
involving felonies and Class A misdemeanors, but not cases involving juvenile defendants, 
defendants convicted of Class B and Class C misdemeanors, or death penalty cases. 
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prosecutors to stop charging mandatory minimums in drug cases involving low-
level, nonviolent drug defendants.3 As I have shown in other work, prosecutors 
around the country appeared to comply with the memorandum and charged fewer 
mandatory minimums in cases against low-level, nonviolent drug defendants 
following the policy change. Yet, the ultimate sentences that eligible defendants 
received did not meaningfully change, nor did racial disparity in sentencing. 
Mandatory minimum entrenchment explains this incongruity—namely, interrelated 
institutional and behavioral elements have connected federal drug sentences to 
mandatory minimums even when such minimums are not applicable. 
The essay ends by arguing in Part IV that Congress must amend the Act to 
reduce or eliminate its mandatory minimum provisions. Doing so would address the 
many interconnected ways that mandatory minimums affect drug sentences. Part IV 
suggests that we should not expect such a shift to usher in an era of wildly disparate 
sentences across defendants—a concern that motivated the adoption of mandatory 
minimums into the Controlled Substances Act more than thirty years ago. Unlike 
the indeterminate sentencing environment in which the mandatory minimums were 
enacted, eliminating mandatory minimums today would leave intact the entire 
Guidelines regime. 
 Part IV then argues that it is extremely likely that Congressional action to 
reduce or eliminate mandatory minimums would prompt the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to promulgate new drug guidelines that are supported by empirical 
evidence, as it is well-positioned to do.4 Without mandatory minimums to which it 
calibrates the drug guidelines, the U.S. Sentencing Commission would be free to use 
its unique expertise to ensure that federal sentences are “sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing.5 Eliminating or 
reducing mandatory minimums would also undercut the prosecutorial practice of 
 
3    Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Department 
Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain 
Drug Cases (Aug. 12, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-
policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist-enhancements-in-certain-
drugcases.pdf [hereinafter Holder Memo]. Attorney General Jeff Sessions rescinded the Holder 
Memo on May 10, 2017. See Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, on Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download. 
4    Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–09 (2007) (“Congress established the 
Commission to formulate and constantly refine national sentencing standards. Carrying out its charge, 
the Commission fills an important institutional role: It has the capacity courts lack to base its 
determinations on empirical data and national expertise, guided by a professional staff with appropriate 
expertise.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
5    28 U.S.C. § 991 (2008) (directing the U.S. Sentencing Commission to “establish sentencing 
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system that [] assure the meeting of the purposes 
of sentencing as set forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)”]).  
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using the threat of a mandatory minimum to induce defendants to quickly plead 
guilty or provide assistance to the government.  
II. MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT 
 
The Controlled Substances Act criminalizes the manufacture, distribution, or 
dispensation of illegal drugs, as well the possession of drugs with intent to 
manufacture, distribute, or dispense them.6 The Act sets mandatory minimum 
sentences based on the quantity and type of drugs involved in the offense, while also 
accounting for whether the offense resulted in death or serious bodily injury, and the 
extent of the defendant’s past criminal record.7 This part broadly describes the 
adoption of mandatory minimum penalties in the Act in the 1980s, how they have 
been applied in the years since, and the intense public debate that mandatory 
minimums have generated over the last 35 years. From this history, a few points 
become clear. First, the mandatory minimum provisions of the Controlled 
Substances Act were created hastily, with little empirical basis. In the years that 
followed, public opinion toward mandatory minimums reversed direction and many 
lawmakers admitted that the provisions were a mistake. As I describe in Part III 
infra, this early punitiveness has far-reaching consequences for all defendants 
charged with drug offenses.  
 
A. The Introduction of Mandatory Minimums into the Controlled Substances Act 
 
The Controlled Substances Act was originally enacted as Title II of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (the “1970 Act”).8 
The 1970 Act reflected a “hybrid law-enforcement and public-health approach to 
drug policy.”9 For example, Congress listed the purposes of the 1970 Act as 
 
6    21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018). The Act also criminalizes simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844. 
Most federal drug prosecutions involve drug trafficking offenses rather than simple possession. For 
example, in fiscal year 2017, just six percent of defendants convicted of drug offenses were convicted 
of simple possession. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
S-14 (22d ed. 2017) (Table 3 reporting 1,301 out of 20,607 defendants convicted of a drug offense 
were convicted of simple possession).  
7    21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2018) (mandatory minimums for drug trafficking offenses). 
Between 1986 and 2010, some possession offenses carried mandatory minimums of up to 90 days. See 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, tit. I, § 1052, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-08 (1986) 
[hereinafter 1986 Act] (creating mandatory minimum of fifteen and ninety days of imprisonment for 
defendants who are convicted of simple possession under 21 U.S.C. § 844 and have one or more prior 
drug convictions, respectively); Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 3, 124 Stat. 2371, 
2372 (2010) [hereinafter Fair Sentencing Act] (eliminating the mandatory minimum provisions for 
simple possession).  
8    Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, tit. II, § 
404, 84 Stat. 1236, 1264–65 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Act].  
9    David T. Courtwright, The Controlled Substances Act: How a “Big Tent” Reform 
Became a Punitive Drug Law, 76 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 9, 10 (2004); see also ERICH 
GOODE, DRUGS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 165 (2005) (“[President] Nixon was the only recent 
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providing “increased research into, and prevention of, drug abuse and drug 
dependence”; providing for “treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers and drug 
dependent persons” and, lastly, strengthening “existing law enforcement 
authority.”10 The 1970 Act repealed nearly all mandatory minimum penalties that 
were contained in the Act’s predecessor statute, the Narcotic Drugs Import and 
Export Act.11 As the U.S. Sentencing Commission has described, at the time the 
1970 Act was passed, mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses had grown 
“increasingly unpopular” among lawmakers and the public.12 The 1970 Act only 
included a narrow mandatory minimum provision for drug offenses involving 
continuing criminal enterprises.13  
Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, the politics of federal drug law and 
policy began to change as Congress adopted a more punitive approach to drugs as 
part of the Tough on Crime era. As this section will describe, the federal approach 
to drug crime in the late 1980s involved three defining characteristics: the adoption 
of severe mandatory minimums that would ultimately reach many defendants 
convicted of drug crimes, the perpetuation of racial disparity in federal prosecutions 
of drug offenses, and the increased power of prosecutors.  
Congress first tested the waters in 1984 with a narrow mandatory minimum 
provision requiring a three-year minimum sentence for a person convicted of 
distributing a controlled substance in or near a school if the person had a previous 
drug conviction.14 The bulk of mandatory minimum provisions were added to the 
Controlled Substances Act two years later, when Congress passed the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 (“the 1986 Act”).15 The 1986 Act created the vast, overarching 
structure of mandatory minimum penalties for federal drug trafficking offenses that 
has endured, largely unchanged, to present-day. Specifically, the 1986 Act created 
mandatory five- and ten-year minimum terms of imprisonment for offenses 
involving certain quantities of heroin, cocaine, phencyclidine (PCP), lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD); fentanyl; and marijuana.16 The 1986 Act also established 
 
president whose record reflected a stronger domestic commitment to rehabilitation and treatment 
than to enforcement.”).  
10   1970 Act, supra note 8, 84 Stat. at 1236.  
11   Id., 84 Stat. at 1291–92.  
12   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2017), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2017/20170711_Mand-Min.pdf.  
13   1970 Act, supra note 8, 84 Stat. at 1265.  
14   H.R.J. Res. 648, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 405A, 98 Stat. 1837, 2069 (1984).  
15   1986 Act, supra note 7, 100 Stat. 3207.  
16   Id., 100 Stat. at 3207-2-3. The triggering quantities for a five-year mandatory minimum were: 
100 grams (heroin); 500 grams (cocaine); 5 grams (cocaine base); 10 grams (PCP); 1 gram (LSD); 40 
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increased mandatory minimum penalties if the offense caused serious physical harm 
or if the defendant had prior drug convictions.17  
The 1986 Act’s aggressive mandatory minimum penalties were a response to 
the historical moment. During the 1980s, lawmakers came to view the national crack 
cocaine epidemic as a significant social and public health crisis. Crack cocaine—a 
popular form of cocaine base18—spread throughout the United States in the 1980s.19  
By the mid-1980s, the crack cocaine epidemic generated much sensationalist media 
coverage20 and nearly universal public concern.21 This public understanding of the 
epidemic was explicitly racialized. As Professor LaJuana Davis explains, “[d]rug 
abuse in the United States has been ‘popularly understood as a black problem,’ and 
blacks and cocaine have historically been connected.”22 The problem was brought 
 
grams (fentanyl); 100 kilograms (marijuana). The triggering quantities for a ten-year mandatory 
minimum were: 1 kilogram (heroin); 5 kilograms (cocaine); 50 grams (cocaine base); 100 grams (PCP); 
10 grams (LSD); 400 grams (fentanyl); 1000 kilograms (marijuana).  
17   Id.  
18   “Cocaine base” is the statutory term that encompasses crack cocaine. Cocaine base, or, 
“cocaine in its base form” includes “the cocaine in coca paste, crack cocaine, and freebase.” DePierre 
v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 74 (2011) (holding that the term “cocaine base” in the Controlled 
Substances Act is “cocaine in its base form”). In contrast, powder cocaine is chemically different 
because it is cocaine in its salt form (cocaine hydrochloride). Id.  
19   The rise in cocaine use was due in part to the fact that crack cocaine is relatively easy to 
produce using powder cocaine, baking soda, and water, and available to purchase in small, inexpensive 
quantities that could be smoked (rather than snorted or injected), which appeals to users. LaJuana 
Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence Relevant in Crack Cocaine 
Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 375, 378–79 (2011).  
20   As one scholar described a few years after the 1986 Act’s passage, “In spite of [crack 
cocaine’s] recent explosion in use, the extent of its use has nonetheless been greatly exaggerated by the 
media.” GOODE, supra note 9, DRUGS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (9th ed. 2014).  
21   JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 
158 (2017) (“At the height of the epidemic, black political and civic leaders often compared crack to 
the greatest evils that African Americans had ever suffered.”); Jennifer Robison, Decades of Drug Use: 
The ‘80s and ‘90s, GALLUP, (July 9, 2002), https://news.gallup.com/poll/6352/decades-drug-use-80s-
90s.aspx (reporting that in 1986, Americans reported that “crack” and “other forms of cocaine” beat 
“alcohol abuse” in a survey question that asked Americans, “Which one of the following do you think 
is the MOST serious problem for society today?”) Peter Kerr, Anatomy of the Drug Issue: How, After 
Years, It Erupted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/17/us/anatomy-of-
the-drug-issue-how-after-years-it-erupted.html (noting that although “statistics showed no sudden rise 
in drug use,” America, in 1986 “erupted with concern about illegal drugs”).  
22   Davis, supra note 19 at 376 (quoting David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1292 (1995)). In contrast, Congress’s approach to the recent opioid 
crisis has been markedly different. Jelani Jefferson Exum, From Warfare to Welfare: Rethinking the 
Purposes of Sentencing During the Opioid Crisis, 67 U. Kan. L. Rev. 941, 942 (“Now that the drug 
emergency is portrayed as destroying wholesome American communities—as opposed to poor, crime-
ridden communities of color—the tone has changed from punishment toward treatment and 
rehabilitation.”).  
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into sharper public view when two high-profile athletes died from cocaine overdoses 
within eight days of each other in 1986. On June 19, 1986, 22-year-old college 
basketball player Leonard Kevin “Len” Bias died of a cocaine overdose just two 
days after being drafted second in the NBA draft by the Boston Celtics.23 A rumor 
spread through the press that Bias—who was Black—died while smoking crack 
cocaine; in fact, his overdose was caused by powder cocaine.24 Eight days later, 
another Black athlete, Donald Rogers of the Cleveland Browns football team, also 
died from a cocaine overdose on the day before his wedding.25 In 1986, media 
coverage of the crack cocaine epidemic skyrocketed.26  
The 1986 Act thus passed in the midst of what scholars have described as a 
“panic”27 and a “frenzy”28 over the rise of crack cocaine use in the U.S. population, 
despite the fact that the vast majority of cocaine users at that time reported using 
powder cocaine.29 The 1986 Act was introduced by Rep. James Wright, Jr. on 
September 8, 1986.30 It passed quickly and nearly unanimously in both chambers of 
 
23   Keith Harriston & Sally Jenkins, Maryland Basketball Star Len Bias is Dead at 22, WASH. 
POST, June 20, 1986, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/sports/longterm/memories/bias/launch/bias1.htm. 
24   Davis, supra note 19 at 381 n.32; Adam M. Acosta, Len Bias’ Death Still Haunts 
Crack-Cocaine Offenders After Twenty Years: Failing to Reduce Disproportionate Crack-
Cocaine Sentences Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, 53 HOW. L. J. 825, 827 n.4 (2010); Jon Schuppe, 30 
Years After Basketball Star Len Bias’ Death, Its Drug War Impact Endures, NBC NEWS (June 
19, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/30-years-after-basketball-star-len-bias-
death-its-drug-n593731.  
25   Steve Geissinger, The Death by Cocaine Overdose of Cleveland Browns Star Don 
Rogers, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (July 5, 1986), https://apnews. 
com/ba448cb5f70f0e72f1b1255480c98c94. 
26   See Spencer A. Stone, Federal Drug Sentencing—What was Congress Smoking? The 
Uncertain Distinction between “Cocaine” and “Cocaine Base” in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 
30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 297, 311–12 (2007) (noting that NBC News ran 400 reports on crack in the 
months before the passage of the 1986 Act); KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICS OF SIN: DRUGS, 
ALCOHOL, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 51 (Routledge 1994) (finding a six-fold increase in news coverage 
between 1985 and 1986).  
27   Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Crack Cocaine, Congressional Inaction, and Equal Protection, 37 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 241, 241 (2014).  
28   Keith M. Kilty & Alfred Joseph, Institutional Racism and Sentencing Disparities for Cocaine 
Possession, 4 J. POVERTY 1, 2 (1999).  
29   NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE, NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE: 
HIGHLIGHTS 1988 8 (1990), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/131341NC JRS.pdf (Figure 1 
showing that crack cocaine use constitutes a small fraction of total cocaine use).  
30   1986 Act, supra note 7, 100 Stat. 3207  
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Congress31 at a time when Republicans controlled the presidency and the U.S. 
Senate, but Democrats controlled the U.S. House of Representatives.  
The 1986 Act was passed without any hearings or input from the federal 
judiciary, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Bureau of 
Prisons, defense attorneys, advocates, or defendants convicted of drug offenses.32 
Floor debate was largely agreeable because few lawmakers objected to the bill.33 
Many observers attribute the 1986 Act’s hurried passage to a confluence of factors—
growing concern about the dangers of crack cocaine, the deaths of Bias and Johnson, 
and political urgency on the part of then-Speaker of the House of Representatives 
Thomas Phillip “Tip” O’Neill to win back control of the Senate in the 1986 midterm 
elections.34 President Ronald Reagan signed the bill into law on October 27, 1986.35 
Exactly one week later, Democrats went on to net eight Senate seats—enough for a 
55-45 majority.36  
Notably, Congress chose a criminal law approach to the cocaine epidemic, 
rather than the public health approach originally championed in the 1970 Act.37 
Lawmakers repeatedly emphasized, however, that the 1986 Act’s mandatory 
minimum provisions were designed to harshly punish serious drug traffickers rather 
than lower-level drug users and sellers.38 The 1986 Act’s ability to narrowly target 
the most serious drug “kingpins” however, was undermined by one of its most 
 
31   Record Vote No. 378, 99th Cong., Sept. 11, 1986 (Yea-Nay vote 392-16 in the House of 
Representatives); Record Vote No. 302, 99th Cong., Sept. 30, 1986 (Yea-Nay vote 97-2in the Senate).  
32   John Arit, A Timeline of the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, THE 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-
rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983 (quoting Eric Sterling).  
33   See supra note 31 (1986 Act passed nearly unanimously in both chambers).  
34   Jonathan Easley, The Day the Drug War Really Started, SALON (June 20, 2011), 
https://www.salon.com/2011/06/19/len_bias_cocaine_tragedy_still_affecting_us_drug_law/.  
35   1986 Act, supra note 7, 100 Stat. 3207.  
36   E.J. Dionne Jr., Democrats Rejoice at 55-45 Senate Margin But Still Seek Agenda to Counter 
Reagan; Big Political Shift, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/11/0 
6/us/democrats-rejoice-55-45-senate-margin-but-still-seek-agenda-counter-reagan-big.html.  
37   MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 49–50 (2012) (“Practically overnight the 
budgets of federal law enforcement soared . . . . By contrast, funding for agencies responsible for drug 
treatment, prevention, and education was dramatically reduced.”). For a comparison of how Congress’s 
treatment of the cocaine epidemic compares to the recent opioid epidemic, see generally Exum, supra 
note 22.  
38   See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 27188 at 21788 (1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“These 
[mandatory minimum] penalties are appropriately aimed at the drug kingpins.”); id. at 27193–4 
(1986) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“For the kingpins—the masterminds who are really running 
these operations . . . we require a jail term upon conviction . . . . Our proposal would also provide 
mandatory minimum penalties for the middle-level dealers as well); id. at 22697 (statement of 
Rep. Roukema) (supporting the 1986 Act because it “provides stiff mandatory penalties for large-
scale drug trafficking”).  
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destructive provisions: a 100:1 disparity in the quantity of cocaine base relative to 
powder cocaine necessary to trigger the Act’s mandatory minimum penalties.39 
Under the 1986 Act, for a given quantity of cocaine base, a person would need to 
possess 100 times that quantity of powder cocaine to trigger the same mandatory 
minimum. Because the majority of people convicted of possessing powder cocaine 
are White and the majority of people convicted of possessing cocaine base are 
Black,40 the 100:1 rule generated massive racial disparity in incarceration for federal 
drug offenses, a problem the U.S. Supreme Court discussed at length in Kimbrough 
v. United States.41  
The 100:1 disparity survived several constitutional challenges, as courts 
repeatedly held that Congress had a rational basis for treating drug crimes involving 
cocaine base more harshly than those involving powder cocaine.42 Further 
exacerbating racial disparity two years later, Congress enacted a five-year 
mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession of five grams or more of cocaine 
base.43 Cocaine base was the only controlled substance for which a mandatory 
minimum attached to simple possession. For all other controlled substances, 
including powder cocaine, the statutory maximum sentence for simple possession 
was no more than three years of imprisonment.44  
Reflecting the view that one benefit of mandatory minimums is that they induce 
defendants to cooperate with prosecutors, the 1986 Act also created an exception 
that allowed defendants to receive sentences below their mandatory minimum if they 
provide substantial assistance to the government.45 Under this provision, a judge 
may sentence a defendant to a reduced sentence, including a sentence below the 
mandatory minimum, “upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has 
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person 
who has committed an offense.”46 Many drug defendants rely on this provision to 
receive sentences below the mandatory minimum.  
 
 
39   1986 Act, supra note 7. 
40   In fiscal year 2016, for example, among federal drug defendants to whom just one type 
of drug was attributed, 65 percent of powder cocaine defendants were white, and 84 percent of 
crack cocaine defendants were Black.  
41   Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 98–99 (2007).  
42   CHARLES DOYLE, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING OF FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES, 
CONG. RES. SERV. REPORT NO. R45074 at 38–39 n. 295 (listing cases).  
43   Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6371, 102 Stat. 4181, 4370 
(1988) [hereinafter 1988 Act].  
44   See 1986 Act, supra note 7, 100 Stat. at 3207–8 (statutory maximums for possession 
offenses ranged between one and three years depending on the defendant’s criminal record).  
45   18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1986); 1986 Act, supra note 7, 100 Stat. at 3207.  
46   Id.  
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B. Mandatory Minimums in the 1990s through 2010s: A Partial Retreat 
 
Almost immediately after the 1986 Act was passed, advocates, scholars, 
legislators, and civil servants sounded the alarm that the Act’s mandatory minimum 
provisions led to harsh and racially disparate sentences, particularly for low-level 
defendants, who Congress had not intended to be affected by mandatory 
minimums.47 After a concerted lobbying effort, Congress created another 
mechanism through which certain low-level drug defendants could obtain relief 
from an otherwise applicable mandatory minimum at sentencing: the safety-valve. 
The safety-valve provision was part of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 (popularly called the “1994 Crime Bill”).48 A person is 
eligible for relief under the safety-valve provision—meaning they can be sentenced 
below their mandatory minimum—if they satisfy five criteria.49 First, the person 
must have minimal criminal history.50 Second, they must not have used violence in 
the commission of the offense and, third, the offense must not have resulted in a 
serious injury.51 Fourth, they must not have been a leader, organizer, or supervisor 
in the offense.52 Finally, the defendant must make a proffer that the government 
accepts as true of all that they know about the offense.53 While the safety-valve 
provided relief to some low-level drug defendants, its strict requirements leave many 
federal drug defendants ineligible.  
In 2010, Congress reduced the 100:1 crack-powder disparity that persisted for 
more than twenty years despite forceful criticism of its racially disproportionate 
impact.54 The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 did so by increasing the threshold 
 
47   See, e.g., Marvin D. Free, The Impact of Federal Sentencing Reforms on African Americans, 
28 J. BLACK STUD. 268, 269–70 (1997); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES 
IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 33 (2011) (finding that the five- and ten-year mandatory 
minimum penalties often apply to offenders who perform relatively low-level functions, despite 
Congress’s intent to limit those mandatory minimums to serious or major traffickers).  
48   Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VIII, § 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985–86 (1994).  
49   18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (1986).  
50   From the creation of the safety valve until December 2018, the Act limited the safety valve 
to defendants who do “not have more than 1 criminal history point.” The First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 
115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018) expanded safety valve eligibility to include defendants who do “not 
have: (A) more than four criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from 
a 1-point offense . . . ; (B) a prior 3-point offense . . . ; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense.” 
51   Id. § 3553(f)(2)–(3).  
52   Id. § 3553(f)(4).  
53   Id. § 3553(f)(5).  
54   See generally, e.g., Davis, supra note 19; Sklansky, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined.; DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL UNDER LAW; RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (2008); 
Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity—The Data Tell Us that It Is 
Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. 87 (2003); William Spade, Jr., Beyond 
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quantities of cocaine base necessary to trigger mandatory minimums, which reduced 
the disparity to 18:1—the ratio that remains in place today.55 The Fair Sentencing 
Act also eliminated the five-year mandatory minimum for simple possession of 
crack cocaine.56 Although the Fair Sentencing Act represents important progress 
toward reducing racial disparities in federal drug prosecutions, it left intact the 
mandatory minimum architecture that characterizes these cases. It also left 
unchanged the mandatory minimums for all drug-trafficking offenses involving 
substances other than cocaine base. 
 
C. The Continuing Debate over Mandatory Minimums 
 
As described in the Part II.A, supra, mandatory minimum penalties were widely 
popular when Congress passed the 1986 Act. In the decades that have followed, 
public opinion has sharply reversed course. In 2016, nearly 80 percent of Americans 
favored ending mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses.57 This section 
begins by describing the main arguments made in support of mandatory minimums: 
that they deter, that they create uniformity in sentencing, that they express societal 
outrage, that they incapacitate, and that they are an important prosecutorial tool. 
After cataloging the reasons upon which mandatory minimums have been 
traditionally justified, subsection II.C.2 describes the grounds upon which 
mandatory minimums are most frequently attacked: their extraordinary harshness, 
their exacerbation of racial disparity, and the uneven bargaining dynamics that they 
promote between defendants and prosecutors. 
 
 
the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233 (1996) 
see also Editorial, 100-to-1 Rule, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/opinion/15thu3.html.  
55   Fair Sentencing Act, supra note 7, at 2372 § 2. The 18:1 ratio does not appear to have 
a scientific justification—rather, it was a compromise reached between Senator Dick Durbin, 
Democrat of Illinois (who preferred a lower ratio) and Senator Jeff Sessions, Republican of 
Alabama (who preferred a larger ratio). The 18:1 ratio compromise earned bipartisan support. 
Adam Liptak, Judges See Sentencing Injustice, but the Calendar Disagrees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
18, 2011. Until 2018, the Fair Sentencing Act did not apply retroactively to prisoners serving 
sentences for drug offenses involving crack cocaine who were sentenced prior to the law. In 
2018, the First Step Act, supra note 50, applied the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively to prisoners 
still serving such sentences. 
56   This mandatory minimum had been added in the 1988 Act. Crack cocaine was the only 
controlled substance for which a mandatory minimum attached to simple possession. See 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).  
57   Voters Want Big Changes in Federal Sentencing, Prison System, PEW (Feb. 12, 2016), 
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2016/02/12/voters-want-changes-
in-federal-sentencing-prison-system.  
36                           OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW               Vol: 18.1:25 
 
1. Support for Mandatory Minimums 
 
Proponents of mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses articulate 
several reasons for their support. First, mandatory minimums traditionally have been 
justified as serving an important deterrent function. Because mandatory minimums 
offer certainty of punishment upon conviction, the argument goes, they will be more 
effective at deterring criminal behavior than indeterminate sentencing regimes.58 
Thus, many proponents believe that mandatory minimums are necessary to 
discourage violations of our nation’s drug laws. 
In floor debate over the House bill that would be enacted as the 1986 Act, 
members of both political parties articulated deterrence rationales for mandatory 
minimums.59 In the Senate, Senator Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, made this 
view clear, saying, “[T]he convicted defendant must—I repeat, must—be sentenced 
to the penitentiary . . . . [T]he law also will make it clear exactly the minimum 
number of years he must stay there. So, these would-be criminals will know that in 
advance, as well.”60  
Second, many supporters of mandatory minimums in the 1986 Act believed the 
provisions would create uniformity in federal sentencing by limiting judicial 
discretion. In the late 1980s, much of the American public viewed the courts as too 
easy on criminal defendants.61 Moreover, many lawmakers believed that 
indeterminate sentencing regimes led to widely disparate sentences being imposed 
across defendants convicted of the same criminal offense. Mandatory minimums 
were thought to rein in this disparity by imposing more uniformity on sentences.  
Third, many proponents conceptualize mandatory minimums in expressive 
terms. For example, in a 1999 debate over the merits of mandatory minimums, then-
Representative Asa Hutchinson, Republican of Arkansas, argued that mandatory 
minimums are justified because they express society outrage at drug use and 
 
58   See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing 
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing 
System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 187, 192 (1993) (arguing that prior to 1984, criminal sentencing 
“lacked the certainty necessary to inspire public confidence and operate as a meaningful deterrent to 
crime” and that mandatory minimums were one approach to achieving deterrence).  
59   See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. 22731 (1986) (statement of Rep. Lehman) (explaining that the 
mandatory minimum provisions were designed “to deter the would-be drug trafficker from getting 
involved in drug trafficking and [to] penalize those who are continuing to make drugs available on the 
streets”); id at H22669 (statement of Rep. Wolf) (“We must also let drug traffickers know that their 
illegal actions will be severely punished an the bill’s provisions to stiffen penalties for drug offenders, 
including establishing minimum mandatory 5- and 10-year prison terms for major drug trafficking, are 
critical”).  
60   132 CONG. REC. 27193 (1986) (statement of Sen. Byrd).  
61   See, e.g., Loretta J. Stalans & Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay 
Evaluations of Criminal Sentencing, 14 L. & HUMAN BEH. 199, 199 (1990) (“In public opinion polls, 
a substantial proportion of lay respondents report that judges are too lenient.”).  
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trafficking.62 Rep. Hutchinson argued that mandatory minimums are an expression 
of societal outrage at the proliferation of illegal drugs. This proliferation, he argued, 
“destroys families and wrecks the lives of individuals each year. And so, it’s 
reasonable for society to express its outrage and to take action to confront this 
problem, both in terms of firearms and in terms of drugs.”63  
Rep. Hutchinson’s remarks also echo 1980s-era incapacitation-based 
arguments that lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for drug trafficking are 
justified because they protect vulnerable young people from the dangers of drug use 
(especially crack cocaine use) and the violence with which it is associated.64 Some 
have argued that judges and even prosecutors are (or were) not sensitive enough to 
these harms. For example, during floor debate on the 1986 Act, Senator Pete 
Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, predicted, “when prosecutors stop viewing 
drug cases as a low priority, and when judges stop viewing the possession of small 
amounts of drugs as a ‘victimless crime,’ then we will be achieving a fundamental 
change in attitudes that will lead to a decrease in drug usage.”65  
Fourth, mandatory minimums are powerful tools for prosecutors. Prosecutors 
are the gatekeepers of mandatory minimum penalties because they can choose 
whether to file charges that trigger mandatory minimums. Thus, mandatory 
minimums can induce defendants to cooperate with the government in order to avoid 
a lengthy mandatory minimum.66 Mandatory minimums also help prosecutors obtain 
guilty pleas, although, as the U.S. Sentencing Commission has pointed out, 
policymakers usually do not publicly voice this rationale when defending mandatory 
minimums.67  
 
62   Stanley Sporkin & Asa Hutchinson, Debate Moderated by Cokie Roberts, Mandatory 
Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable Weapon in the War on Drugs or a Handcuff on 
Judicial Discretion?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1282 (1999). Hutchinson is now the governor 
of Arkansas.  
63   Id. at 1283. Others have denounced this rationale. See, e.g., Michael Tonry, The Mostly 
Unintended Effects of Mandatory Penalties: Two Centuries of Consistent Findings, 38 CRIME & 
JUST. 65, 67 (arguing that the outrage justification “has no place in a society that takes human 
rights seriously”).  
64   See Alyssa L. Beaver, Note, Getting a Fix on Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Reforming 
the Sentencing Scheme of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2546 
(2010).  
65   132 CONG. REC. 27175 (1986) (statement of Sen. Domenici).  
66   There are two statutory provisions that allow a defendant to be sentenced below the 
mandatory minimum—the substantial assistance provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and the safety-valve 
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Both provisions require a defendant to cooperate with the 
government—either by providing information that can help the government bring a case against 
someone else (substantial assistance) or by proffering to the government everything the person knows 
about the offense (safety valve).  
67   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 14–15 (1991), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-
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At the time the 1986 Act was passed, many lawmakers viewed mandatory 
minimums as an important and justified prosecutorial tool. For example, in floor 
debate, Senator Lawton Chiles, Democrat of Florida, argued that mandatory 
minimums “help our law enforcement officials by strengthening criminal penalties 
for drugs like crack cocaine. This is an absolutely essential first step. Current law 
makes it very difficult to arrest and convict crack dealers.”68 Although many 
lawmakers justified mandatory minimums based on their prosecutorial potential, 
others argue that these bargaining dynamics deserve criticism. This and other 
criticisms of mandatory minimums are described in the next subsection.  
 
2. Criticisms of Mandatory Minimums 
 
Mandatory minimums for drug offenses have long generated condemnation. 
Most criticism falls into one of three broad categories. First, rather than expressing 
the public’s outrage at drug crime, many view mandatory minimums as overly harsh. 
Mandatory minimums for illegal drug trafficking are extremely punitive. They range 
from five years to life in prison. This punitiveness is particularly acute in the context 
of drug crimes because drug offenses are often charged as conspiracies in which the 
quantity of drugs involved are attributed to all members of the conspiracy, including 
minor participants. As a result, harsh mandatory minimums can reach defendants 
who operated at low levels of the conspiracy, subverting the legislative intent of the 
1986 Act.69 This problem is especially grave because low-level participants often 
are unable to receive substantial assistance reductions if they do not have enough 
information about people who are higher up in the conspiracy, leading to what 
scholars have called the “cooperation paradox.”70  
 
minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf [hereinafter 1991 REPORT] (“Although infrequently 
cited by policymakers, prosecutors express the view that mandatory minimum sentences can be 
valuable tools in obtaining guilty pleas, saving scarce enforcement resources and increasing the 
certainty of at least some measure of punishment. In this context, the value of a mandatory minimum 
sentence lies not in its imposition, but in its value as a bargaining chip to be given away in return for 
the resource-saving plea from the defendant to a more leniently sanctioned charge.”).  
68   132 CONG. REC. 26447 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles).  
69   See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 199, 212 (1993) (“Normal principles holding defendants accountable for the acts of their 
co-conspirators, even if carefully applied, can leave low-level dealers, middlemen and more 
important distributors responsible for the same quantity of drugs flowing through the 
conspiratorial network.”); see also Neal K. Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 1307 
(2003) (providing both moral and utilitarian justifications for using conspiracy law to low-level 
members of drug trafficking organizations).  
70   See Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and 
the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1863–64 (1995); Schulhofer, supra note 69.; 
Shana Knizhnik, Note, Failed Snitches and Sentencing Stitches: Substantial Assistance and the 
Cooperator’s Dilemma, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1722, 1726 (2015).  
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Federal judges are among those who consider drug mandatory minimums to be 
excessively severe. A 2010 survey found that 62 percent of federal district judges 
felt that mandatory minimums were too harsh.71 Roughly half of all federal drug 
defendants receive a sentence below their recommended Guidelines range—a higher 
rate of below-Guidelines sentencing than in any other major offense category.72 Nor 
is it unusual for a federal district judge to sentence a defendant to the mandatory 
minimum while lamenting their powerlessness to reduce the sentence further to one 
the judge would find appropriate.73 The safety-valve exception was meant to address 
this problem, but it is a blunt instrument with which to grant mercy. Given its strict 
requirements, there are likely to be many people who will not qualify for the safety 
valve but for whom a mandatory minimum sentence is still too harsh. Low-level 
defendants might also voluntarily opt out of safety-valve relief if they do not want 
to proffer to the government, perhaps because they fear retaliation for doing so.74  
Second, rather than equalizing sentences, as proponents argue, mandatory 
minimums disproportionately affect people of color, especially Black defendants. 
For example, Professors M. Marit Rehavi and Sonja Starr have found that 
prosecutors are more likely to charge crimes carrying a mandatory minimum when 
the defendant is Black.75 This charging disparity appears to have heightened in 
response to increased judicial discretion in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
2005 decision in United States v. Booker.76A new paper by Cody Tuttle also finds 
that prosecutors are more likely to charge mandatory minimum-triggering quantities 
 
71   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES 
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010 5 (2010), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-
surveys/surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf [hereinafter 2010 SURVEY].  
72   Author’s own calculations using the Commission Datafiles, supra note 2.  
73   See, e.g., United States v. Dossie, 851 F.Supp.2d 478, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“The only 
reason for the five-year sentence imposed on Dossie is that the law invoked by the prosecutor 
required it. It was not a just sentence.”).  
74   See, e.g., United States v. Tang, 214 F.3d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The [safety valve] 
statute makes no exception for failure to furnish information because of feared consequences, yet 
it seems unlikely that Congress was unaware that those with knowledge of narcotics traffic would 
in some instances have legitimate apprehension about disclosing what they know . . . . We see 
no basis for creating a fear-of-consequences exception to the safety valve provision.”).  
75   See M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 
122 J. POL. ECON. 1320 (2014).  
76   See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: 
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L. J. 2 (2013); Crystal S. Yang, 
Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75 
(2015); Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? 
Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268 (2014). A new working paper also documents racial 
disparities in mandatory minimum charging. Cody Tuttle, Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing: 
Evidence from Drug Mandatory Minimums (working paper 2019), 
http://econweb.umd.edu/~tuttle/files/tuttle_mandatory_minimums.pdf.  
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of crack cocaine against Black and Hispanic federal defendants, and suggests that 
racial discrimination is to blame.77 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has also long criticized mandatory 
minimums for the racial disparities they produce. In 1990, Congress posed a series 
of questions to the Commission about the newly-created mandatory minimums and 
Sentencing Guidelines. The Commission responded to these inquiries in what 
appears to be its first report to Congress.78 The Commission’s second key finding in 
the 1990 Report was that mandatory minimum sentences appear to be disparately 
applied in a way that is “related to the race of the defendant, where whites are more 
likely than non-whites to be sentenced below the applicable mandatory 
minimum . . . .”79 Despite Congress’s view that mandatory minimums would lead to 
more equal sentences for similarly-situated defendants, the Commission criticized 
mandatory minimums on the ground that “offenders seemingly not similar 
nonetheless receive similar sentences,” and concluded that “the most efficient and 
effective way for Congress to exercise its powers to direct sentencing policy is 
through the established process of sentencing guidelines.”80  
Third, critics have objected that mandatory minimums shift the power 
dynamics between defendants, prosecutors, judges, and even police officers in 
detrimental ways.81 According to the “hydraulic theory” of discretion, mandatory 
minimums remove discretion from sentencing judges, which transfers power to 
prosecutors—who have the charging power.82 When a defendant is convicted of a 
crime carrying a mandatory minimum, the judge’s hands are tied. Unless one of the 
two statutory exceptions are available, the sentencing judge has no power to impose 
a lenient sentence, even if the sentencing judge believes the mandatory minimum 
sentence is greater than necessary to serve the purposes of punishment. As a result, 
prosecutors have tremendous influence over the ultimate sentences that drug 
defendants receive. Moreover, because both the safety-valve and substantial 
assistance reductions are cooperation-based, prosecutors play a large role in 
 
77   Cody Tuttle, Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing: Evidence from Drug Mandatory 
Minimums (Oct. 28, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 /papers.cfm?abstract_id=3080463. 
78   See generally 1991 REPORT, supra note 67.  
79   Id. at ii.  
80   Id. at ii, iv.  
81   See MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL 
COURT 121–26 (2016) (describing how federal prosecutors use the threat of 851 enhancements, which 
increase the mandatory minimums for drug defendants who were previously convicted of a felony drug 
offense, to induce defendants to plead guilty or provide assistance).  
82   See Terence D. Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices under Determinate 
Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 155, 155–56, (1987) (“[M]ost researchers begin with the assumption that the 
displacement of discretion exists and then proceed to describe the various adaptive responses to such 
structural changes.”).  
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deciding whether a defendant has satisfied these provisions. Prosecutors thus have 
enormous power to induce a defendant to share information with the government, 
even if doing so is dangerous to the defendant themselves or their family. Some 
defense attorneys have also argued that mandatory minimums can lead to increased 
police misconduct.83  
Debate over mandatory minimums largely focuses on the provisions 
themselves—how they are used or threatened in individual cases and their effects in 
the aggregate. In Part III, I argue that another important aspect of mandatory 
minimums—and part of what makes them so powerful—is their reach beyond cases 
in which they are charged. 
 
D. Trends in Mandatory Minimum Charging and Sentencing 
 
This section provides a descriptive account of mandatory minimum charging 
and sentencing for federal defendants convicted of drug offenses over the last several 
decades. Figure 1 plots the prevalence, average sentences, and average mandatory 
minimums for federal drug defendants dating back to the mid-1990s. Figures 2 and 
3 plot trends in mandatory minimum charging for federal drug defendants by race 
and Hispanic ethnicity.84 Each Figure includes a vertical line in 2010 to delineate 
the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act. It is important to note that the Fair 
Sentencing Act took effect on August 3, 2010—less than two months before the end 
of fiscal year 2010. Any effects of the Fair Sentencing Act will likely begin to appear 
in fiscal year 2011—one year past the reference line in Figures 1, 2, and 3.  
 
 
83   Scott Hechinger, Opinion, How Mandatory Minimums Enable Police Misconduct, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/opinion/mandatory-
minimum-sentencing.html; Richard A. Oppel Jr., Sentencing Shift Gives New Leverage to 
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/26/us/tough-
sentences-help-prosecutors-push-for-plea-bargains.html.  
84   I use the term Hispanic because this is the terminology used in the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission data.  
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Figure 1. Federal Drug Charging and Sentencing, Over Time 
 
In Figure 1,85 the light blue solid line plots the yearly average sentence (in 
months of incarceration) imposed on all federal defendants who are convicted of 
drug offenses. It should be read using the left axis. The average sentence for a federal 
defendant convicted of a drug offense is around eighty months, and appears to move 
cyclically, increasing in 2002, decreasing in 2008, and increasing again in 2017.86 
Although sentences for defendants convicted of drug offenses decreased after 
 
85   Figure 1 uses data from the annual Sourcebooks of Federal Sentencing Statistics 
published by the United States Sentencing Commission. See generally U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, Sourcebook Archives, https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive (last visited 
July 13, 2020). In each year after 1996, the number of defendants charged with mandatory 
minimums, by primary offense type, are reported in Table 43, “Drug Offenders Receiving 
Mandatory Minimums for Each Drug Type.” In 1996, this information was reported in Table 39, 
with the same title. Mandatory minimum charging information was aggregated by the author for 
fiscal years in which the Sourcebooks subdivided the tables due to Supreme Court decisions 
(2004 and 2005).  
86   This pattern seems to loosely coincide with changes in the party of the Presidency 
(roughly decreasing during the Clinton and Obama presidencies and increasing during the 
George W. Bush and Trump presidencies).  
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passage of the Fair Sentencing Act, this looks like a continuation of an earlier trend 
beginning around 2008, which is consistent with other research.87  
 The bottom gray-blue dashed line plots the fraction of all federal defendants 
who are convicted of drug offenses. It should be read on the right axis. Federal 
defendants convicted of drug offenses hovered around 40 percent until 2002. 
Between 2002 and 2010, the share of federal defendants who were convicted of drug 
offenses steadily declined to around 30 percent, where it has remained. This 
decreasing trend is likely due to the rise of criminal immigration prosecutions over 
the period, which diluted the share of drug prosecutions in the federal criminal 
system.  
Finally, the middle dark blue dotted line plots the estimated average mandatory 
minimum under the Controlled Substances Act for drug defendants. It should be read 
on the left axis. Defendants charged with drug offenses who had no mandatory 
minimum are included in the average as zeroes. For the first eighteen years (1996-
2013), average mandatory minimums follow a shape that is nearly parallel to the 
average sentence—which could reasonably lead observers to believe that mandatory 
minimums are an important determinant of sentence length. However, in 2013 these 
trends separate, with mandatory minimum charging sharply dropping relative to 
sentencing. Part III.B, infra, explains this separation to be a consequence of 
mandatory minimum entrenchment. 
 
87   David Bjerk, Mandatory Minimum Policy Reform and the Sentencing of Crack 
Cocaine Defendants: An Analysis of the Fair Sentencing Act, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 370, 
370 (2017) (finding that the mean sentence length for defendants convicted of drug offenses 
involving crack cocaine fell beginning around 2007 and continued following the Fair Sentencing 
Act).  
44                           OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW               Vol: 18.1:25 
 
 
Figure 2. Mandatory Minimum Charging for Federal Drug Defendants, By 
Defendant Race and Ethnicity 
 
Figure 2 plots the average drug mandatory minimum for Black, Hispanic, and 
White defendants convicted of federal drug offenses, over time.88 Defendants 
convicted of drug offenses who did not face a mandatory minimum are included in 
the averages with mandatory minimums equal to zero. Until 2012, Black defendants 
convicted of drug offenses (top blue-gray dashed line) were subject to larger 
mandatory minimums than Hispanic and White defendants convicted of drug 
offenses. In those years, Hispanic and White defendants convicted of drug offenses 
had roughly equal average statutory minima.  
The average mandatory minimums for Black defendants convicted of drug 
offenses began to fall after 2010—consistent with the Fair Sentencing Act reducing 
mandatory minimum charging by increasing the quantity of crack cocaine necessary 
to trigger a mandatory minimum, which primarily affected Black defendants. By the 
last five years in the data—2013 through 2017—raw racial disparity in mandatory 
minimums (that is, the amount of space between the trend lines for each group) is 
much smaller than in the first several years. 
 
 
88   This Figure was produced using the Commission Datafiles, supra note 2.  
2020  MANDATORY MINIMUM ENTRENCHMENT  45 
 
Figure 3. Mandatory Minimum Charging for Federal Drug Defendants as a 
Proportion of the U.S. Adult Population 
 
Figure 3 plots the number of Black, Hispanic, and White defendants convicted 
of drug offenses who faced any mandatory minimum, as a proportion of the Black, 
Hispanic, and White U.S. adult populations.89 As a proportion of the White U.S. 
adult population, White defendants are much less likely to be charged with a federal 
drug offense carrying a mandatory minimum than Black and Hispanic defendants—
only three out of every 100,000 White adults are charged with a mandatory 
minimum for a federal drug offense each year. 
Before the Fair Sentencing Act, Black and Hispanic defendants were charged 
with drug mandatory minimums roughly seven times as often as White defendants: 
 
89   This Figure was produced using the Commission’s annual data files, see id., as well as 
intercensal estimates of the United States adult population. For years 2011 through 2016, these 
population estimates are from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Monthly Population Estimates by Age, Sex, Race, 
and Hispanic Origin for the United States: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/popest/2010s-national-detail.html (last visited 
July 17, 2010). For years 2000 through 2010, these population estimates are from U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, Intercensal Estimates of the Resident Population by Single Year of Age, Sex, Race, and 
Hispanic Origin for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2000, 
https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/time-series/demo/popest/intercensal-2000-2010-national.html 
(last visited July 17, 2020).  
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around twenty out of every 100,000 Black adults and 22 out of every 100,000 
Hispanic adults was charged with a drug mandatory minimum in 2002 through 2009. 
This trend reversed for Black defendants around or slightly before passage of the 
Fair Sentencing Act in 2010. By 2016, only ten out of every 100,000 Black adults 
and 15 out of every 100,000 Hispanic adults were charged with a drug mandatory 
minimum. Despite these gains, however, Black and Hispanic defendants continue to 
be overrepresented relative to their share of the U.S. adult population.  
It is important to note, however, that these Figures are insufficient to fully 
understand the consequences of mandatory minimums. The reason is that only 
looking at cases in which mandatory minimums were charged ignores the important 
structural ways that mandatory minimums affect criminal sentencing for all drug 
defendants, as described in the next Part. 
 
III. MANDATORY MINIMUM ENTRENCHMENT 
 
In this Part, I argue that a critical aspect of mandatory minimums in the 
Controlled Substances Act—and part of what makes them so formidable—is the 
extent to which they are interconnected with other aspects of the federal criminal 
process, an institutional framework I call mandatory minimum entrenchment. Part 
III.A presents the concept of mandatory minimum entrenchment. III.B describes a 
case study that illustrates the power of mandatory minimum entrenchment by 
documenting the meager sentencing response to a 2013 federal policy change that 
directed all federal prosecutors to stop charging mandatory minimums against low-
level, nonviolent drug defendants.  
 
A. Mandatory Minimums, the Sentencing Guidelines, and Sentencing Outcomes 
 
Understanding the scope of the Act’s mandatory minimum provisions presents 
a challenge. One might start by conceptualizing mandatory minimums as fixed 
elements—simply applying in some federal criminal cases and not others. In this 
Part, I argue that this simplistic view of mandatory minimums overlooks the way 
that these statutory provisions support the larger sentencing framework in which 
they are entrenched. As a result of this mandatory minimum entrenchment, the 
mandatory minimum provisions of the Controlled Substances Act affect sentences 
for all defendants convicted of drug offenses—not just those who are formally 
charged with a mandatory minimum.  
Mandatory minimum entrenchment is primarily reinforced by two aspects of 
federal sentencing: first, that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (which apply to all 
defendants convicted of drug offenses) are tethered to the mandatory minimum 
provisions; and second, that judges and prosecutors are heavily influenced by the 
Guidelines in deciding sentences and sentencing recommendations.  
The most direct way that mandatory minimums affect sentences for drug 
defendants who are not charged with a mandatory minimum is through the 
application of the Guidelines. The Act’s mandatory minimums and the Guidelines 
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share a common history. As described in Part II.A, Congress added the first 
mandatory minimum to the Controlled Substances Act in 1984. That year, Congress 
also enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, which established the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission and authorized the Commission to create binding sentencing guidelines 
(the “Guidelines”). Since their creation, the Guidelines for drug offenses have been 
explicitly tied to the mandatory minimum provisions of the Act. As the Director of 
the Federal Judicial Center explained in 1992, “[M]andatory minimum sentencing 
statutes operate concurrently with the guidelines and, indeed, formed the basis for 
the Commission’s drug guidelines. It is therefore not possible to disentangle the 
effects of mandatory minimums from those of the sentencing guidelines.”90  
Because the Guidelines calibrate to the Act’s mandatory minimums, a person 
who is not charged with a mandatory minimum, or who avoids one through safety-
valve relief or a substantial assistance reduction, will still fall into a Sentencing 
Guidelines range that reflects (or, nearly reflects)91 what would have been their 
mandatory minimum based on the quantity of drugs that can be attributed to them.  
As an example, suppose a defendant with no criminal record was charged in 
1987 (the first Guidelines year) with possessing with intent to distribute ten grams 
of cocaine base. This offense violates 21 U.S.C. § 841(B)(i), and in 1987 would have 
been subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.92 The defendant’s 
Guidelines range would have been calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The 
defendant’s base offense level would have been determined based on the Drug 
Quantity Table, which in 1987 would have produced an offense level of 26 based on 
drug type (cocaine base) and quantity (ten grams).93 If the defendant were in the 
lowest criminal history category and received no adjustments to the offense level, 
the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range would have been 63-78 months, just 
higher than the five-year mandatory minimum triggered by the Act. Recall that at 
this time the Guidelines were mandatory. Thus, even if the defendant had avoided 
being subject to the mandatory minimum, they still would have received a sentence 
of approximately the same length as the mandatory minimum.  
Since 1987, the Commission has, with limited success, attempted to reform 
sentencing of defendants convicted of drug offenses, but has been unwilling to 
uncouple the Guidelines from the mandatory minimum provisions of the Controlled 
Substances Act. Before the Fair Sentencing Act was passed in 2010, the 
Commission’s efforts largely focused on trying to reduce the 100:1 disparity. In 
1995, 1997, and 2002, the Commission made proposals to reduce the disparity, but 
 
90   William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums: The Need for 
Separate Evaluation, 4 FED. SENTENCING. REP. 352, 352 (1992).  
91   A drug defendant who receives safety-valve relief will usually receive a two-level reduction 
in their offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(18), which will reduce their Guidelines range by 
around 25 percent.  
92   See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
93   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2.38 (1987).  
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Congress rejected these proposals.94 In 2007, the Commission acted on its own to 
amend the Guidelines,95 and Congress did not object. The 2007 amendment reduced 
the base offense levels for drug-trafficking offenses involving cocaine base by two 
levels, without changing the base offense levels for drug-trafficking offenses 
involving any other controlled substances.96 As a result, after the 2007 Guidelines 
Amendments, a defendant in the lowest criminal history category and responsible 
for ten grams of cocaine base (as in the previous paragraph) would earn a base 
offense level of 24 and fall into a Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months rather than 
63 to 78 months.97 Critically, the new Guidelines range—although reduced—still 
encompassed the mandatory minimum, reflecting the Commission’s “recogni[tion] 
that establishing federal cocaine sentencing policy ultimately is Congress’s 
prerogative.”98 In its report to Congress, the Commission emphasized that it viewed 
this reduction “only as an interim solution to some of the problems associated with 
the 100-to-1 drug quantity ratio.”99 When the Fair Sentencing Act passed in 2010 
and reduced the crack-powder disparity to 18:1, the Commission again recalibrated 
the Guidelines to align with the new mandatory minimums.100  
Although the Guidelines are now advisory,101 mandatory minimum 
entrenchment is further reinforced by prosecutorial and judicial practices and norms 
of adhering to the Guidelines. For federal prosecutors, for example, this practice is 
 
94   Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25075-
25077 (May 10, 1995) (proposing a 1:1 ratio); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2 (Apr. 1997) (proposing a 5:1 ratio) 
https://fsr.ucpress.edu/content/ucpfsr/10/4/184.full.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (May 2002), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/drug-
topics/200205-rtc-cocaine-sentencing-policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf 
(proposing reducing the ratio to at least 20:1); Pub. L. No. 104-38 § 1, 109 Stat. 334 (1995) (rejecting 
the 1995 proposed amendment).  
95   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS, 72 Fed. Reg. 28558, 28571-72 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 GUIDELINES AMENDMENTS].  
96   Id.  
97   U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(8) 
(2007).  
98   2007 GUIDELINES AMENDMENTS, supra note 95, 72 Fed. Reg. at 28573.  
99   Id.  
100  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
2D1.1(c) (2011). In November 2014, the Commission amended the Guidelines to reduce the base 
offense level for all drug offenses by two levels. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO 
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Nov. 1, 2014), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/official-text-
amendments/20140430_Amendments.pdf.  
101  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005).  
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formalized in their employee manual, which instructs federal prosecutors to seek 
sentences within defendants’ advisory Guidelines ranges and requires prosecutors to 
get supervisory approval before requesting an out-of-range sentence.102  
Judges also are both formally and behaviorally bound to the Guidelines, as 
described by Justice Souter as the Guidelines’ “gravitational pull.”103 The Supreme 
Court has required judges to start each sentencing by first calculating the Guidelines’ 
range.104 Federal district judges likely worry that out-of-range sentences are more 
likely to be appealed.105 Many federal circuit courts, for example, hold that within-
Guidelines sentences are presumptively reasonable but do not employ the same 
presumption for sentences outside the Guidelines range.106 Some federal circuit 
courts also require judges to explain deviations from the Guidelines, and more 
significant deviations require more compelling explanations.107 These rulings from 
higher courts tacitly compel district judges to sentence within the Guidelines.  
Judges might also engage in subconscious anchoring. Anchoring is a known 
cognitive bias in which a decision-maker—often subconsciously—heavily relies on 
an initial piece of information when making subsequent decisions. In one famous 
example, participants watched a wheel spun with numbers from 0 and 100.108 The 
volunteers were then asked to adjust that number up or down to indicate how many 
African countries were members of the United Nations. Participants who spun larger 
numbers gave larger estimates, while those who spun smaller numbers gave smaller 
 
102  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL 9-27.730 (2018).  
103  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 390 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
104  Id. at 347–48 (2007) (majority opinion).  
105  See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District 
Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, J. L. ECON. & ORG. 518, 
518–19 (2012) (“Reversal is a burden for district judges, requiring them sometimes to conduct 
new trials and usually to hear new motions, while denying them their preferred outcome. Reversal 
is also potentially embarrassing and detrimental to a trial judge’s prospects for promotion to the 
appeals courts.”); Christina L. Boyd, The Hierarchical Influence of Courts of Appeals on District 
Courts, 44 No. 1 J. Legal Stud. 113, 115 (2015) (arguing that “district judges are greatly affected 
in their decision making by their place at the bottom of the federal judicial hierarchy and their 
role as agent to their courts of appeals’ colleagues.”).  
106  The Supreme Court held that federal courts of appeals may apply a non-binding 
presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines sentences in Rita, 551 U.S. at 341; Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Federal courts of appeals may not, however, apply a 
presumption of unreasonableness to out-of-range sentences. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  
107  See, e.g., United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 216 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The extent of 
the explanation we require of the district court may turn on whether the court has varied from the 
Guidelines range, and, if it has, on the magnitude of the variance.”); United States v. Padilla, 520 
F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that the more a sentence deviates from the Guidelines 
range, “the more detailed the district court’s explanation must be.”).  
108  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974).  
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estimates, even when they were paid based on their accuracy.109 In each case, the 
participants were using the initial number spun on the wheel as an anchor point upon 
which to base their (completely unrelated) decision. Scholars have long argued that 
judges similarly are subject to anchoring bias in sentencing, and research of federal 
sentencing tends to bear out this prediction.110  
Overall, prosecutors and judges appear to be deeply tied to the Guidelines, even 
though they are advisory. The Guidelines therefore create a direct connection 
between mandatory minimums and all drug defendants, regardless of whether 
mandatory minimums are actually applied. 
 
B. Case Study: Charging Policies 
 
A recent policy change in federal drug prosecutions illustrates the power of 
mandatory minimum entrenchment. On August 12, 2013, Attorney General Eric 
Holder distributed a memo to all federal prosecutors, instructing them to stop 
charging mandatory minimums for defendants who meet four criteria (the “Holder 
Memo”).111 First, the defendant’s relevant conduct must not have been violent or 
involved a weapon. Second, the defendant must not have been a leader within a 
criminal organization. Third, the defendant “[must] not have [had] significant ties to 
large-scale drug trafficking organizations, gangs, or cartels.” Fourth, the defendant 
must not have a significant criminal history. The Holder Memo clarified that a 
“significant criminal history will normally be evidenced by three or more criminal 
history points but may involve fewer or greater depending on the nature of any prior 
convictions.”112  
Prosecutors were able to easily carry out this directive due to Alleyne v. United 
States,113 a U.S. Supreme Court case decided roughly two months earlier. In Alleyne, 
the Court held that any fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence for a 
crime must be submitted to the jury (or pled to beyond a reasonable doubt).114 After 
 
109  Id.  
110  See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make 
Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L. J. 695, 695–96 
(2015); Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive Anchoring Effect and Blind Spot Biases in Federal 
Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 
489, 491 (2014) (finding that judges anchored their sentencing decisions to sentencing 
recommendations, that were determined by the judge rolling dice); Yang, Interjudge Disparities, supra 
note 76 (anchoring to the Guidelines is less intense among judges appointed to the bench after Booker).  
111  Holder Memo, supra note 3, at 3.  
112  The Holder Memo also instructed prosecutors not to pursue recidivist enhancements under 
21 U.S.C. § 851 (2020) “unless the defendant is involved in conduct that makes the case appropriate 
for severe sanctions.” Holder Memo, supra note 3, at 3.  
113  See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013).  
114  Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2162–63.  
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Alleyne, facts that increase the mandatory minimum could not simply be found by a 
preponderance of evidence by the judge. Because mandatory minimums in drug 
cases are triggered by drug type and quantity, Holder’s instruction was simple to 
carry out—prosecutors could simply not allege drug quantity in the indictment and 
post-Alleyne, a defendant in such a case would not be subject to the mandatory 
minimum. One Assistant United States Attorney explained that “under Alleyne, the 
prosecutor, at the outset [of a case] has complete control. He or she must exercise 
increased discretion in deciding [the] appropriate [allegations], and therefore 
regulates when the enhanced mandatory punishment is available.”115  
The Holder Memo’s explicit goal was to “ensure that our most severe 
mandatory minimum penalties are reserved for serious, high-level, or violent drug 
traffickers,” and argued that for low-level, nonviolent drug defendants, mandatory 
minimum sentences do not serve the traditional purposes of punishment, including 
public safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Figure 1 suggests, however, that the 
Holder Memo did not work as intended. Although mandatory minimum charging 
(the dark blue dotted line) plummeted after the Memo was promulgated in 2013, 
average sentence length (the light blue solid line) only slightly decreased. In 
contrast, prior to the Memo’s circulation, these two trends—mandatory minimum 
charging and average sentence length—moved almost perfectly in tandem.  
In other work, I carefully explore this phenomenon.116 I show that immediately 
after the Holder Memo was promulgated, mandatory minimum charging sharply fell 
for drug defendants likely to be eligible for leniency under the Memo, while 
remaining largely stable for drug defendants likely to be ineligible under the Memo 
and federal defendants not charged with drug offenses. Figure 4 demonstrates these 
trends and constitutes evidence of substantial, although imperfect, compliance with 
the Holder Memo.  
 
 
115  Robert A. Zauzmer, The Legal Basis and Need for the Smart on Crime Initiative, 63 
U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. 3, 5 (Jan. 2015) (emphasis added).  
116  Stephanie Holmes Didwania, Mandatory Minimums and Federal Sentences (Temple Univ. 
Beasley School of Law Research Paper No. 2020-01) (Oct. 24, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3556138#.  
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Figure 4. Drug Mandatory Minimums Before/After the Holder Memo117 
 
In contrast, I find little evidence that the Memo was effective at achieving its 
primary goal—to significantly reduce sentences in the eligible group. Figure 5 
presents evidence of the Memo’s efficacy—the extent to which it appears to have 
reduced sentences for eligible defendants. For ineligible defendants (red lines), the 
average statutory minimum (dashed line) and average sentence trends (solid line) 
are roughly parallel in both the period leading up to the Holder Memo and the period 
following. Statutory minimums and sentences appear to slightly decrease in the 
period after the Memo takes effect, but this trend might have started around the 
fourth quarter of 2012. Because the Memo was not designed to alter charging 
behavior for ineligible defendants, the lack of change post-Memo is consistent with 
what one would expect. Among eligible defendants (blue lines), the relationship 
between the average statutory minimum and average sentence length is more 
complicated. In the period before the Holder Memo was distributed, average 
sentence length (solid line) and average statutory minimums (dashed line) move in 
tandem. After the Memo is distributed, however, the average statutory minimum 
falls, but the average sentence length remains quite flat. This suggests that the 




117  Id. at 18.  
2020  MANDATORY MINIMUM ENTRENCHMENT  53 
 
Figure 5. Average Sentence Length and Statutory Minima Before/After the 
Holder Memo118 
 
This case study suggests that mandatory minimums on their own are not as 
important a driver of sentence length as one might expect. Even after eliminating 
mandatory minimum charges for many low-level defendants in August 2013, 
sentences in this group remained largely unchanged in the months that followed.  
There are two related forces at work that explain this outcome. The first is 
mandatory minimum entrenchment. The Holder Memo made clear that even though 
prosecutors were to stop charging mandatory minimums, they were instructed not to 
make any other changes to the way they prosecute cases. In particular, the Memo 
instructed prosecutors to “be candid with the court . . . including the quantity of 
drugs involved in the offense and the quantity attributable to the defendant’s role in 
the offense, even if the charging document lacks such specificity.”119 Similarly, the 
Memo told prosecutors to “accurately calculate the sentencing range under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines.”120 In other words, the Holder Memo created 
 
118  Id. at 20 .  
119  Holder Memo, supra note 3, at 3.  
120  It appears that prosecutors complied with these instructions—the average base offense levels, 
reported quantities of drugs, and average Guidelines ranges did not change in response to the Holder 
Memo. See Didwania, supra note 116. 
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a regime in which mandatory minimum charges were carefully extricated from many 
prosecutions but the remaining sentencing infrastructure—itself built around and 
reinforced by the mandatory minimums, as described in Part III.A—remained.121 
Importantly, the Guidelines are tied to the mandatory minimum regardless of 
whether it is actually charged, and regardless of whether the defendant actually faces 
a minimum. Thus, judges and prosecutors—faithful to the Guidelines as described 
in the previous subsection—imposed similar sentences as in the pre-Memo period. 
This finding has policy implications discussed below but also provides evidence of 
the power of entrenchment. 
Another reason that the Holder Memo appears to have been largely ineffective 
at reducing sentences for eligible defendants is that many such defendants received 
below-mandatory minimum sentences in the pre-period via the substantial assistance 
and safety-valve reductions. Figure 5 demonstrates that for eligible defendants (blue 
lines), the average sentence length (solid line) is less than the average statutory 
minimum (dashed line) in the pre-period. This means that, on average, the eligible 
defendant’s actual sentence length was less than the applicable mandatory 
minimum. In other words, the leniency offered by the Holder Memo was redundant 
of other forms of leniency that already existed. 
 
IV. REFORMING MANDATORY MINIMUMS IN THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
ACT 
 
Mandatory minimums are among the most heavily criticized provisions of the 
Controlled Substances Act. However, as described in Part III, they are deeply 
entrenched in federal sentencing. The Act’s mandatory minimums are linked to the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission’s drug guidelines such that even if a prosecutor 
chooses not to charge a mandatory minimum, a defendant’s Guidelines range will 
reflect the mandatory minimum. Prosecutors and judges are both formally and 
behaviorally anchored to the Guidelines. This Part argues that the best path forward 
is for Congress to amend the Act to reduce or eliminate mandatory minimums, and 
for the Commission to uncouple the Guidelines from the Act’s mandatory minimum 
provisions.  
First, Congress should consider reducing or eliminating mandatory minimums 
for the reasons described in Part II.D: mandatory minimums impose unduly harsh 
sentences on many defendants, they are disproportionately applied against people 
(especially men) of color, and they create objectionable power dynamics between 
judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, and defendants. Empirical evidence suggests 
that the long prison sentences generated by mandatory minimums are not necessary 
 
121  To the extent that prosecutors use the threat of a mandatory minimum to induce cooperation 
or guilty pleas, see infra  note 81, it is also possible that this dynamic continued to exist after the Holder 
Memo took effect. 
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for deterrence, and public opinion is now hostile toward mandatory minimums, 
which suggests reform could be possible.122  
Because these statutory provisions are the root of entrenchment, eliminating the 
mandatory minimums would destabilize many aspects of federal sentencing for 
defendants convicted of drug offenses. Not only would eliminating or reducing 
mandatory minimums reduce unduly harsh sentences in cases in which they are 
charged, this legislative action would very likely prompt the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission to create new drug guidelines. Given the Commission’s consistent 
criticism of mandatory minimums and its statements that it ties its drug guidelines 
to the mandatory minimums because it believes sentencing policy is Congress’s 
prerogative, it seems extremely likely that, without mandatory minimums, the 
Commission would draft new guidelines for drug offenses that rely on empirical 
evidence and learned experience. If mandatory minimums were reduced but not 
eliminated, it is nearly certain that the Commission would adjust the drug guidelines 
down to reflect the mandatory minimums, as they have always done when 
mandatory minimums have changed. This reduction would therefore benefit all 
defendants convicted of drug crimes, not just defendants charged with mandatory 
minimums.  
Lawmakers might worry that a retreat from mandatory minimums would usher 
in a wave of unfettered discretion for judges, potentially leading to unwarranted 
disparity between similarly situated defendants. However, this worry is unlikely to 
take hold. This concern might have been plausible in 1986, when the Act’s 
mandatory minimums were first enacted and the U.S. Sentencing Commission had 
not yet issued its first Guidelines.123 If mandatory minimums were reduced or 
eliminated today, however, the entire Guidelines regime would remain, which 
provides a check on judicial discretion. It is worth also noting that the vast majority 
 
122  See e.g., Voters Want Big Changes in Federal Sentencing, Prison System, PEW (Feb. 
12, 2016), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2016/02/12/voters-want-
changes-in-federal-sentencing-prison-system (nearly 80 percent of registered voters favor 
eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses). Democratic presidential candidate 
Joe Biden, an original champion of mandatory minimums in the 1986 Act, now supports 
eliminating mandatory minimums. Joe Biden for President: Official Campaign Website, Joe 
Biden’s Criminal Justice Policy, https://joebiden.com/justice/ (“Biden supports an end to 
mandatory minimums. As president, he will work for the passage of legislation to repeal 
mandatory minimums at the federal level. And, he will give states incentives to repeal their 
mandatory minimums.”). President Donald Trump has not expressed support for eliminating 
mandatory minimums, but did sign into law the First Step Act, supra note 50, which expanded 
the safety-valve to reach more defendants and shortened some mandatory minimum sentences.  
123  The Commission’s first Sentencing Guidelines went into effect in November 1987, more 
than a year after the bulk of the Act’s mandatory minimums were added.  
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of federal criminal offenses do not contain a statutory minimum. There is no good 
reason to treat drug offenses so differently.124  
In the alternative, if Congress does not amend the Act, the Commission might 
consider uncoupling the Guidelines from the Act’s mandatory minimum provisions, 
a change that most federal judges would likely support.125 The Commission made 
progress on this front with the 2014 drug guidelines Amendments, which reduced 
the base offense levels by two levels for all drug types. However, the Amendment 
“[e]nsure[d] the guideline penalties remain[ed] consistent with existing five- and 
ten-year statutory mandatory minimum drug penalties by structuring the Drug 
Quantity Table.”126  
A bolder change by the Commission is likely necessary to meaningfully reduce 
sentence length for drug trafficking defendants. Such a move would be well within 
the Commission’s congressional mandate, which instructs the Commission to 
“insure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence 
other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first defendant who has 
not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense, and the 
general appropriateness of imposing a term of imprisonment on a person convicted 
of a crime of violence that results in serious bodily injury.”127 As the Court described 
in Kimbrough, “The crack cocaine Guidelines… do not exemplify the Commission’s 
exercise of its characteristic institutional role. In formulating Guidelines ranges for 
crack cocaine offenses . . . the Commission looked to the mandatory minimum 
sentences set in the 1986 Act and did not take account of “empirical data and national 
experience.”128 Today, the evidence suggests that the Commission has not fulfilled 
this worthy instruction. 
  
 
124  In fact, Congress occasionally directs the Sentencing Commission to calibrate the Guidelines 
to be near the statutory maximum for some defendants (see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2006)), but 
Congress gives the Commission no such instruction when it comes to federal drug offenses.  
125  According to a 2010 survey of federal district judges (the most recent year survey information 
is available), 58% agreed with the statement “The sentencing guidelines should be ‘de-linked’ from 
statutory mandatory minimum sentences (i.e., the guideline ranges should be set by the Commission 
independently from mandatory minimum sentences).” Thirty-four percent “strongly” agreed, and 24% 
“somewhat” agreed. Nineteen percent of federal district judges were “neutral” about the statement, 
14% “somewhat” disagreed and just six percent “strongly disagreed.” 2010 SURVEY, supra note 71.  
126  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to Reduce Drug Trafficking 
Sentences (Apr. 10, 2014), https://www.ussc.gov/about/news/press-releases/april-10-2014.  
127  28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (2020).  
128  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007).  
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